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Abstract
This study examines the relationship between player pay dispersion and team performance in the 
National Basketball Association (NBA) in North America. Specifically, the pay dispersion across 
teammates in each NBA team was analyzed according to four different models based on their playing 
time and team performance. Salary data for all NBA teams were collected over 23 consecutive seasons 
from between 1995-96 to 2017-18. Pay dispersion was measured using the Gini coefficient. Key findings 
are that the effects of the dispersion are positive for the model with all players in their teams, whereas 
the effects of pay dispersion on team performance are negative for the models with players who have 
more playing time, which indicates that greater pay dispersion among the most contributing players is 
associated with lower team performance. Teams should consider how they can more fairly allocate their 
capped payrolls among the highest contributing players on their teams based on the equity principle of 
distributive justice. Teams should consider how they prepare and incorporate other reward methods, such 
as signing bonuses, which may reduce injustice perceptions of underpaid players and eventually enhance 
team performance. 
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This article investigates the relationship between 
team pay dispersion and team performance in the 
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National Basketball Association (NBA) according to 
different models based on players' contribution to their 
teams (e.g., playing time). Payrolls for major 
professional leagues, such as the NBA, Major League 
Baseball (MLB), Premier League, and La Liga, have 
drastically increased. For example, the salary cap of the 
NBA increased from 11.871 million dollars (1990/1991 
season) to 109.140 million dollars (2019/2020 season). 
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Certain teams such as the New York Yankees in the 
MLB and Chelsea in the Premier League possess 
considerable economic resources and have invested 
significant funds in order to recruit the most talented 
athletes in their leagues. Those teams with high payrolls 
were expected to perform well in the leagues, and 
empirical studies found a positive correlation between 
the amount of team payroll and team performance 
(Glasnapp, 2004; Hall & Zimbalist, 2002, Tao, Chuang, 
& Lin, 2016). However, as highlighted by Glasnapp 
(2004), a positive correlation does not necessarily infer 
causality between payroll and team performance. In fact, 
Berri and Schmidt (2010) claimed that team pay could 
explain less than 10 percent of the variation of team’s 
win in the NBA and the National Football League 
(NFL) in the US. Indeed, this weak payroll-performance 
is easily noticed that many teams with relatively high 
payrolls in various professional leagues have experienced 
unsuccessful seasons, some even being excluded from 
the playoffs after a regular season. For instance, though 
the New York Yankees have routinely ranked among 
the top two baseball teams in payroll over the past 25 
years, during a four year stretch from 2013-16, the 
team’s performance did not allow for participation in 
postseason play. Nevertheless, given the positive 
relationship between payroll and team performance, 
professional teams must ensure financial efficiency is 
prioritized over misuse of money. 
Against this backdrop (Berri & Schmidt, 2010), one 
method of examining this phenomenon more closely 
would be to explore the relationship between patterns 
of pay distributions on team performance to uncover 
successful strategies because teams that send an 
excessive proportion of their payroll to a handful of 
players are more likely to be unsuccessful due to a lack 
of resources to develop a balanced team (Annala & 
Winfree, 2011). Salary disparity among athletes on a 
team is, in essence, derived from the nature of sports. 
Even though a professional sports organization or team 
is not always analogous to a non-sport organization or 
company, the employment relationship between athletes 
and owners in sports teams is similar to the relationship 
between employees and employers in normal business 
companies. As an employer, an owner is motivated to 
provide a competitive reward system in order to 
stimulate its players’ best performance on the field 
throughout a season. Different from ordinary business 
organizations or companies, the salaries of professional 
athletes heavily depend upon the equity principle, so 
“members or groups who have contributed the most to 
the organization should receive the greatest distributions 
and allocations of resources” (Kim, Andrew, Mahony, 
& Hums, 2008, p. 380). In other words, players’ past 
or expected contributions with productivity, effort, 
ability, spectator appeal, and revenue generation (Hums 
& Chelladurai, 1994; Mahony, Hums, & Riemer, 2002; 
Tornblom & Johnson, 1985) toward their teams’ success 
should receive the greatest reward. Given this context, 
the current study aims to examine the effects of pay 
dispersion on team performance among professional 
basketball teams of the NBA. Particularly, this research 
is designed to examine whether pay dispersion could 
potentially have different effects on team performance 
vertically among all players on a team and horizontally 
within groups based on players’ playing time. Although 
players can contribute their team with their productivity, 
effort, ability, spectator appeal, and revenue generation 
in sports, we utilize playing times as a measure of 
contribution in developing four research models. 
Theoretical Framework
Payroll Dispersion 
Pay dispersion refers to “differences in pay levels 
between individuals within (i.e., horizontal or lateral 
dispersion) and across (i.e., vertical dispersion) jobs or 
organizational levels” (Shaw, 2014, p. 522). The 
dispersion allows relatively few levels, jobs, or 
individuals at the top management or special groups to 
receive a greater portion of money with a wider range 
of payroll across individuals, whereas a compressed 
distribution system pays more equally with a narrower 
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range across jobs or employees within organizations 
(Bloom, 1999). 
In the literature, pay dispersion has been justified and 
understood based on various theoretical frames, such 
as motivation theory (Lawler, 1971), equity theory 
(Adams, 1963), the economics standpoint (Bishop, 
1987), and tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). 
According to the theories, pay dispersion with wide 
differentials within an organization is expected to 
increase employee efforts for higher pay (Lawler, 1971; 
Kepes, Delery, & Gupta, 2009; Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 
2002). The dispersion works as a tool for the 
organization and him/herself to determine whether who 
will stay with the organization or leave the organization 
given the competitive work environment (Lazear, 1999). 
However, there is considerable dispute over the reward 
allocation system in organizations and its effects as 
researchers have shown opposite views and inconsistent 
results regarding whether a wider range of payroll 
across employees are more beneficial than those with 
a narrower range of payroll to organizations (Kepes et 
al., 2009). For instance, Ding et al. (2009) argued that 
vertical dispersion would be positively related to 
performance in an organization because higher pay for 
managerial skills, which are more critical and valuable 
to the organization’s success, could attract talented 
leaders with comparatively rarer skills and abilities, 
which eventually would have a positive association with 
an organization’s performance in areas such as sales 
growth and product/service quality. In contrast, they 
also found that horizontal dispersion would be 
negatively associated with the performance. Hunnes 
(2009) found pay dispersion did not show significant 
associations with organizational productivity. 
Researchers who supported a wider range of payrolls 
among employees, whether the differentials are from 
performance, seniority, or knowledge and skills, 
claimed that the pay allocation strategy should be 
beneficial to organizations. According to Livernash 
(1957), pay levels should be differentiated on the basis 
of an employee’s contributions, human capital, and 
efforts toward their organizations. Hamilton and Macy 
(1923) classified the pay systems into “uniform” and 
“divergent” distributions and also insisted that reward 
for superior individuals should be compensated 
contingently on excess ability, knowledge, skills, 
training, or diligence over common labors. Empirical 
studies of the positive aspects of differentiated pay 
distributions also supports the claim that pay levels with 
different rewards tend to propel enhanced performance 
from employees in the future, and greater pay dispersion 
in the organization motivates employees who have 
shown poor performance to perform better in order to 
receive a higher compensation or bonus (Bishop, 1987; 
Leonard, 1990; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; Shaw et al. 
2002). For example, Mitchell, Lewin, and Lawler 
(1990) found that employees who were paid under 
differentiated incentive systems were more productive 
than the employees who were paid on an hourly basis. 
Shaw et al. (2002) proposed that a positive relationship 
between pay dispersion and organizational performance 
would be expected when the pay dispersions arise from 
individual incentives, which are normatively accepted 
sources within organizations, while a negative 
relationship would be expected for organizations which 
require more interdependent work from their members. 
Beaumont and Harris (2003) stated that “the hierarchical 
model will produce its hypothesized positive 
relationship with performance in organizational settings 
where work interdependencies are minimal, while the 
compressed model will be most effective in a situation 
requiring extensive collaboration” (p. 54). 
On the other hand, researchers argued that a wider 
range of pay differentials could negatively affect 
organizational effectiveness and productivity (Bloom, 
1999; Pfeffer & Langton, 1993). Researchers (Kohn, 
1993; Lazear, 1995; Pfeffer, 1994) indicated that the 
negative impacts of a hierarchical pay distribution on 
teammates with low levels of pay are sources of 
jealousy, organizational disruption, dissatisfaction 
toward job and organization, poor performance, and 
feelings of inequality. Cowherd and Levine (1992) 
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examined 89 corporate business units and found that 
less dispersion in wages between lower level employees 
and upper management resulted in greater product 
quality. Pfeffer and Langton (1993) found that a greater 
degree of wage dispersion among faculty members had 
a negative impact on the level of satisfaction, research 
productivity, and collaborations on research with other 
faculty members. Researchers (Cowherd & Levine, 
1992; Pfeffer, 1994) even proposed that compressed pay 
distributions with a narrow payroll range tend to be 
more desirable to increase group performance, such as 
team-oriented behaviors and common goals, because a 
strong perception of injustice from the differentiated 
compensation could negatively affect the comparatively 
lower paid employee’s performance and eventually 
decrease the overall efficiency of the team. For instance, 
Deutsch (1985) insisted that pay compression utilized 
with the equality principle of distributive justice is 
instrumental in developing harmonious social relations, 
cooperation, effort, and commitment. Empirical 
evidence of positive effects of compressed pay distributions 
has largely corroborated previous theoretical research. 
Outcomes of Pay Dispersion in Sports 
Researchers often have utilized sport organizations 
or teams to examine the effects of payroll on team 
performances (Bloom, 1999; Glasnapp, 2004; Hall & 
Zimbalist, 2002; Mizak & Anthony, 2004; Sommers, 
1998). Because of the public nature of sports, 
researchers can easily obtain players’ data, such as 
salary and performance information, while researchers 
encounter greater challenges to collect similar 
information in non-sport organizations. Concerning pay 
dispersion, the contrastive effects of pay dispersion on 
performance were also noted in sports. For individual 
sports, Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990) found that 
hierarchical prize distributions significantly induced 
better player performance on the European professional 
golf tour, and Becker and Huselid (1992) also found 
hierarchical distributions to be associated with results 
on automobile race competitions. 
When it comes to team sports, many studies have 
shown inconsistent results regarding the effects of pay 
dispersion on team performance. Frick, Prinz, and 
Winkelmann (2003) examined the effects of the 
dispersion of four major sports (e.g., basketball, ice 
hockey, baseball, and soccer) in the US and reported 
that the effects of internal payment dispersion on sports 
teams could depend on the sport. According to Frick 
et al. (2003), inequality in sports with relatively few 
players, such as basketball and ice hockey, seemed to 
benefit their team's performance, whereas sports with 
more registered players, such as soccer and baseball, 
were affected by income inequality. 
Mondello and Maxcy (2009) examined the impact of 
salary dispersion and team performance in the National 
Hockey League (NHL) and found a team’s performance 
was inversely related to the degree of pay dispersion 
among the teams, which did not support Frick et al.’s 
(2003) study. In the MLB, several studies (Annala & 
Winfree, 2011; Similarly, Jewell, & Molina, 2004; Tao 
et al., 2016; Wiseman & Chatterjee, 2003) reported that 
salary inequality in the MLB had negative effects on 
team performance. In other words, pay distribution with 
a narrow range of dispersion positively affected team 
performance. However, Tao et al. (2016) found that the 
relationship became weaker as a payroll relative position 
(a team’s payroll rank in the MLB) was included as 
a control variable because inter-team pay dispersion is 
more influential on team performance than intra-team 
pay dispersion in their study. Coates, Frick and Jewell 
(2016) revealed the productivity of major league soccer 
(MLS) teams in the US could be harmed by the salary 
inequality. Collectively, the findings from these studies 
support the negative effects of pay dispersion noted by 
Depken (2000). Levine’s (1991) hypothesis insisted that 
pay dispersion should likely prompt jealousy and 
mistrust among teammates, and eventually reduce 
overall team performance. In other words, many 
underpaid athletes in a team perceive salary unfairness 
compared to relatively few highly compensated star 
Pay dispersion and team performance in the NBA 5
players, and the perceptions of injustice tend to affect 
their emotions, cognitions, and performances on the 
field. Eventually, when those injustice perceptions 
influence team performance, the pernicious effects 
become more evident in spite of higher-than-average 
team payroll. 
However, the research also produced inconsistent 
results related to outcomes. For instance, Halevy, Chou, 
Galinsky and Murnighan (2012) found hierarchical 
differentiation in the NBA had a positive relationship 
with team performance via intragroup coordination and 
cooperation within teams and insisted that pay 
dispersion could improve team performance for 
procedurally interdependent sports like basketball (as 
opposed to procedurally independent sports like 
baseball). Berri and Jewell (2004) found no significant 
relationship between pay dispersion and team 
performance in the NBA. Franck and Nuesch (2011) 
reported that high- or low-degree pay dispersion 
strongly influenced team performance, while mid-level 
dispersion did not seem to be influential. Katayama and 
Nuch (2009) concluded that salary dispersion does not 
influence team performance regardless of the difference 
in measurement groups of income inequality in team. 
Hypothesis Development 
As discussed, inconsistent results regarding the 
effects of pay dispersion in various sports have been 
reported by many studies. However, given that equity 
theory (Adams, 1963) and expectation theory (Vroom, 
1964) suggest that higher value rewards incentivize 
team member effort and work contribution, and Ding, 
Akhtar, and Ge (2009) argued that vertical pay disparity 
within an organization would enhance organizational 
performance, it is expected that higher pay dispersion 
among teams should enhance team performance. 
According to tournament theory (Lazear & Rosen, 
1981) asserting that compensation should be based on 
each worker’s relative productivity than their absolute 
productivity, high pay dispersion would be positively 
related to team performance. Frick et al. (2003) insisted 
that high pay dispersion in sports with relatively few 
players like basketball should be beneficial to team's 
performance and Halevy et al. (2012) found positive 
relationship between pay dispersion and team 
performance. 
Hypothesis 1. Higher degrees of pay dispersion on 
basketball team members will be beneficial to team 
performance.
As the overall literature on pay dispersion highlights, 
the impact of income disparity on organizational 
outcomes may differ according to diverse 
circumstances. On one hand, payment discrimination 
according to the hierarchy in an organization or based 
on performance outcomes and task requirements would 
seemingly be beneficial for obtaining organizational 
efficiency (Hamilton & Macy, 1923; Livernash, 1957). 
On the other hand, income disparity among teammates 
could undermine critical teamwork behavior and lead 
to dissatisfaction (Kohn, 1993; Lazar, 1995; Pfeffer, 
1994) based on team-cohesiveness hypothesis (Levine, 
1991) suggesting that a low level of pay dispersion 
within an organization could decrease dissonance 
among its members in the organization, which can help 
team cohesiveness and performance. Notwithstanding 
case sensitivity, previous sport research dealt with rigid 
situations by focusing on the fragmentary point of view. 
Given these contradictory findings, the primary purpose 
of this study is to examine the relationship between pay 
dispersion and team performance according to four 
different groups of players based on their playing time. 
Kulik, Lind, Ambrose and MacCoun (1996) argued 
that individual characteristics and backgrounds could 
impact each person’s perception of justice because of 
their different self-interests or emphases. Therefore, 
individual differences should influence corresponding 
reactions to the perceived inequality (Beersma et al. 
2003; Trever & Wazeter, 2006). In turn, the effects of 
pay dispersion on performance and attitudes toward the 
dispersion could be moderated by individual differences 
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(Frank, 1985; Martin, 1981). In other words, the status 
differences experienced by individual players in a team 
could prompt different perceptions of fairness regarding 
pay dispersion in the team, which may eventually 
influence individual or team performance. Hunnes 
(2009) insisted that horizontal disparity had a negative 
impact on organizational performance. According to 
Ding et al. (2009) and Hunnes (2009), the practice of 
paying higher wages to more experienced and talented 
players through vertical pay dispersion could be a 
natural outcome that is beneficial in professional sports. 
However, when it comes to a group of crucial athletes, 
like starting players, horizontal pay disparity could have 
a negative impact on team performance. Trevor and 
Wazeter (2006) stressed the perception of negative pay 
dispersion pervades individuals with low salaries within 
their payment system. Bucciol, Foss, and Piovesan 
(2014) examined effects of pay dispersion and team 
performance in Italian football league and revealed that 
the effects of pay dispersion on team performance could 
be positive and negative based on different definitions 
of team, although the same data were analyzed. In the 
study, the effect was negative when they only included 
the players who actually played in a given match and 
considered each player’s actual playing time, but the 
effect disappeared and became positive as the 
definitions of team expanded. Accordingly, hypothesis 
2 was proposed.
Hypothesis 2. Higher degrees of pay dispersion 
among the members who contribute the most in a 
basketball team will have negative impact on team 
performance.
Salary Policies in the NBA
The NBA has unique salary policies compare to other 
professional sports. According to the collective 
bargaining agreement between the NBA and National 
Basketball Player Association (NBAP), salary for rookie 
player are different from the status of draft. Once 
players were drafted in first round, they can get paid 
as followed by the rookie scale salary. The salary for 
the first pick is 8.131 million dollars in 2019/2020 
season and 30th pick can get 1.613 million dollars. The 
player drafted in second or later rounds, or undrafted 
players can make a free contract that more than 
minimum salary ($582,180 in 2019/2020 season). 
Players become a restricted free agent (RFA) after they 
fulfill 4 years of service time. RFA players can get 
offered 1-year qualifying offer from their current team 
which is bigger than either 125% of current salary or 
minimum salary plus 20 million dollars. If a player does 
not accept qualifying offer, other teams can offer him 
2 year or longer contract. After players played additional 
years under RFA, they become a free agent and there 




Pay dispersion can be measured from two different 
perspectives: concentration and dispersion (Cowell, 
2011). The most widely used indicator, the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), is based on the 
concentration approach and can be calculated by the 
sum of squares on ratio of individuals’ income for 
overall payroll of an organization. However, since the 
HHI measures the income concentration of selected 
players with market structure perspectives such as a 
monopoly or oligopoly, the index does not clearly 
indicate inequality (Cowell, 2011). Relative Standard 
Deviation (RSD), the ratio of the standard deviation to 
the mean of data, is seen as a representative indicator 
for the dispersion among observations (Brown, 1998). 
RSD, which was derived from statistical theories, can 
be applied to a wide range of fields of study to measure 
dispersion among observations (Limpert, Stahel, & 
Abbt, 2001). A more specific indicator to measure 
dispersion from an economic sense is the Gini 
coefficient (Cowell, 2011). The Gini coefficient, 
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originally developed to assess income and wealth 
inequality of nations, has also been employed in various 
studies (e.g., income distribution among nations, or 
measure to compare income inequality for regions) to 
measure pay dispersion (Cowell, 2011, Schmidt & 
Berri, 2001, Coates, Frick & Jewell, 2014). In this study, 
the Gini coefficient is utilized to evaluate pay dispersion 
because it was originally developed to measure 
inequality in economic status. The values of Gini 
coefficient range between 0 and 1, and the result 
indicates more equal status as the value is closer to 0. 
Empirical Framework
For the current empirical study, salary data from all 
teams in the NBA in North America were collected from 
basketball-reference.com over 23 consecutive seasons 
between 1995-96 and 2017-18 (see footnote). The NBA 
was selected because it is relatively easier to assess each 
individual player’s impact on his team performance 
compared to other team sports with more participating 
players (e.g., baseball and soccer). A total of 681 
observations were collected for nine seasons (1995-96 
to 2003-04) with 29 teams, and 14 seasons (2004-05 
to 2017-18 season) with 30 teams. For the same period, 
salary data for each individual player were also 
acquired. Players whose salary data were not available 
were excluded from our data set. Last, a total of 9,990 
data points were collected for players’ salary.
Based on the data collected, the following model was 
established:
wpit = ORTGit + DRTGit + PDit + αi + λt + εit
Wp represents a winning-percentage of team, ORTG 
refers to offensive ratings, DRTG shows defensive 
ratings, and PD represents pay dispersion of team i at 
season t. The winning percentage was calculated by 
dividing wins by the number of games. ORTG and 
DRTG were estimates of point scored (allowed) in 100 
possessions of balls in games. We divided ORTG and 
DRTG into 100 to make our regression estimator easier 
to read. These indices indicated the efficiency of offense 
and defense of each team within the seasons. We used 
the Gini coefficient to measure pay dispersion for each 
team. Based on the dispersion measure, the current 
study proposed four empirical models. The first model, 
including all players, represents the dispersion for all 
players. For the second model, we excluded players 
whose average playing times in one season were less 
than 12 minutes (a quarter of a game) to eliminate less 
influential players in each team performance. The third 
model only measured the pay dispersion for the players 
with an average playing time of more than 24 minutes 
(half of a game) in one season. In the final model, only 
the five players who had the longest average playing 
times for each team were included in measuring pay 
dispersion. 
To certify validity of the suggested models, the 
Hausmann test, Breusch-Pagan’s Lagrange Multiplier 
(LM) test, and Pesaran’s cross-sectional dependency 
(CD) test were performed. R version 3.3.3 was used 
for all statistical analyses. 
Results
Validity of Models
Before estimating the effects of the pay dispersion 
on performance, several tests were conducted (e.g., 
Hausman test, Breusch-Pagan’s LM test, and Pesaran’s 
CD test) in order to verify our empirical models. The 
tests were conducted based on the first model, which 
included all players in measuring pay dispersion. First, 
a Hausman test was performed to verify a better model 
between a fixed effect and random effect model. The 
result showed that the null hypothesis (fixed effect) was 
rejected (x2 = 4.620, p = .202). Second, the results of 
Breusch-Pagan’s LM test about time effect and 
individual effect of panel data indicated significant 
effects in time effect test (x2 = 9.966, p = .002) but 
insignificant effects in individual effect (x2 = .055, p =
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.815). Last, the results of Pesaran’s CD test to detect 
correlation within cross-sectional data supported 
cross-sectional dependence (z = -3.317, p = .001). All 
results are presented in Table 1. In conclusion, a random 
effect model with time effect was accepted for the 
research model in this study. For the estimation of 
relation between pay dispersion and performance 
outcomes, a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) 
estimator was applied in this empirical study to control 
for cross-sectional dependency.
Test Test Statistics p
Hausman test x2 = 4620, df = 3 .202
BP LM test for time effect x2 = 9.966, df = 1 .002
BP LM test for individual effect x2 = 0.055, df = 1 .815
Pesaran CD test z = -3.317 .001
Table 1. Results of Model Validity Tests.
Result of Estimation
The results of the FGLS estimator revealed the 
relationship between predictors (offensive rating, 
defensive rating, and pay dispersion) and team 
performances. As the R2 for the respective models 
indicated, the independent variables explained the 
change of winning percentage around 94%. The 
offensive ratings and defensive ratings had significant 
impacts on winning percentage for all four models in 
positive and negative ways, respectively. Because 
offensive rating concerns points earned during the game 
and defensive rating involves points allowed, the signs 
of each variable showed opposite directions in 
significant magnitude. In all models, the coefficient of 
ORTG and DRTG were about 3 and -3, respectively, 
which implied the increase of one unit in ORTG led 
to 3 percentage points growth for winning percentage 
whereas wp declined 3 percentage points as DRTG 
increased in one unit.
The research question of the current study is 
addressed by observing relations between pay dispersion 
with winning percentage in the proposed empirical 
models. In the first model, pay dispersion positively 
influenced team performance (β = .041, p < .05). However, 
for the second model, the results showed that the 
impacts of pay dispersion among players who actively 
participated in more than 25% of each game on average 
were insignificant (β = .005, p > .05). Moreover, the 
magnitude of the impact also decreased vis-à-vis the first 
model. In the third model, the direction of the effect 
of the dispersion was changed from “positive” to 
“negative,” which showed inconsistent results from the 
first and second models (β = -.014, p < .05). Last, 
concerning the fourth model, the results revealed more 
substantial negative effects of pay dispersion on team 
performance (β = -.026, p < .05). Therefore hypotheses 
1 and 2 were supported. 
Discussion
There is a widespread view amongst various 
professional teams in prominent sports leagues that a 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Variables Coeff. std. err Coeff. std. err Coeff. std. err Coeff. std. err
(constant) .464* .024 .481* .026 .490* .026 .496* .027
ORTG 3.036* .018 3.049* .019 3.042* .019 3.040* .020
DRTG -3.022* .019 -3.032* .020 -3.029* .020 -3.028* .020
PD .041* .007 .005 .007 -.014* .007 -.026* .007
R2 .942 .941 .941 .942
ORTG = Offensive Ratings, DRTG = Defensive Ratings, PD = Pay Dispersion.
*: significant at 5% level
Table 2. Results of FGLS.
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high expenditure on recruiting the most valuable players 
is the most effective way to achieve optimal sporting 
performance. However, such an investment should be 
well spent in an efficient and effective way to achieve 
satisfactory results. Therefore, the findings of this study 
provide insights on the potential relationship between 
a well-balanced pay distribution to athletes in a team 
sport and that team’s performance. 
The statistical estimation for the first model revealed 
that pay dispersion of all players was associated with 
positive effects on each team’s performance, which was 
consistent with the finding of Halevy et al.’s (2012) 
NBA study. However, the finding of the current 
research was inconsistent with other existing studies 
(Depken, 2000; Mondello & Maxcy, 2009; Wiseman 
& Chatterjee, 2003) featuring data from the NHL and 
MLB, thus supporting Levine’s (1991) hypothesis that 
greater pay dispersion across teammates could reduce 
overall team performance because of jealousy and 
mistrust among teammates. However, the most 
significant finding of this research was that the positive 
effects decreased as the number of players studied was 
reduced based on average playing time. Furthermore, 
the effects on team performance eventually became 
negative for the players with an average playing time 
of more than 24 minutes, and substantial negative 
effects on team performance were noticed for players 
who have the most playing time on their teams. In other 
words, the lower Gini coefficients across the team’s 
most talented players resulted in greater team 
performance in the NBA. These findings were 
consistent with the results of Bucciol et al.’s (2014) 
Italian football league study since the negative effects 
of pay dispersion only existed among players with more 
playing time.
Berri and Jewell (2004) suggested that wage 
inequality and team performance were not related in the 
NBA. However, the result of the current study showed 
pay dispersion had both positive and negative impacts 
on the winning percentage of the NBA teams. When 
including all players in the model, pay dispersion is 
associated with better team winning percentages. This 
result supports the justification for vertical 
discrimination of wage in organizations (Ding et al., 
2009; Livernash, 1957; Show et al, 2002) and can be 
explained by Lawler’s (1971) motivation theory. 
Accordingly, rookie players who get paid only the 
minimum amount of salary should be motivated by 
superstars whose salaries are significantly higher in their 
league. Further, starting players often play more 
important roles on their teams, and their tasks are more 
essential than non-starters, which justifies higher 
salaries for starting players as noted by Ding et al. 
(2009). According to the sport economic theory, salary 
is determined by the marginal revenue productivity of 
employees (Quirk & Fort, 1997). Under such a 
paradigm, it would be fair to pay higher salaries to 
players with longer playing times who contribute more 
to the team’s revenue generation as starting members.
The uncovered negative impact of pay dispersion 
among players with more playing time, particularly the 
starting five players, on team winning percentage 
supported the findings of Hunnes (2009), who proposed 
that income discrimination in a horizontal manner 
harmed organizational outcomes. Starting players in the 
NBA typically average over 36 minutes of playing time 
per game, which supports the potential for more points, 
assists, rebounds, steals, and other outcomes that impact 
overall team performance and, consequently, marginal 
revenue productivity. Therefore, one could hypothesize 
that the starting players would consider themselves as 
a group as equally contributing to the team’s winning 
percentage. This result partially contradicts the findings 
of Halevy et al. (2012) in that the hierarchical 
discrimination in procedurally interdependent sports like 
basketball was determined to be beneficial for team 
performance. As Halevy and colleagues maintained, the 
pay dispersion among all players could be positively 
related to team performance, but among the top five 
starting players, the perceived inequality in their 
compensation could harm cooperation or coordination.
The findings of this study supported previous 
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research (Frank, 1985; Martin 1981), suggesting the 
impact of pay dispersion on organizational performance 
and the attitudes towards the dispersion could rely on 
characteristics of employees such as playing time. In 
this study, players who have a longer playing time can 
be perceived as making the most contributions to their 
team; however, when presented with greater pay 
dispersion among their team members, those valuable 
players could perceive injustice from the perspective of 
distributive justice, the perceptions of fairness toward 
outcomes [e.g., the perceived fairness of athletes toward 
their salaries within a team (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 
2001)]. In other words, if a large percentage of a team’s 
payroll is distributed to only a few superstar players, 
the perceived injustice of players who believe that their 
salary is incommensurate with their ability or 
performance can raise a sense of incongruity. According 
to Adams’ equity theory (1965), employees compare the 
ratios of contributions and rewards of each person 
within an organization and experience unfairness when 
their resource distributions are not commensurate with 
their perceived contributions to the organization 
(Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). As a 
result, these individuals could be demotivated, 
distressed and ultimately elect to reduce their 
organizational inputs to restore equity, which would 
compromise both team and individual performance. 
The findings provide important implications to 
managers and other key decision makers regarding pay 
distribution among teams in the NBA. First, given the 
competitive nature of professional sport, unequal pay 
for unequal contribution is expected. On the contrary, 
equal pay for unequal contribution is recognized as an 
inequitable practice (Trevor, Reilly, & Gerhart, 2012) 
because “whenever workers differ in their performance, 
horizontal wage equality violates the equity principle 
since a higher effort is not rewarded with a higher wage” 
(Abeler, Altmann, Kube, & Wibral, 2010, p. 1300). 
Therefore, team owners and managers should consider 
how they can more fairly allocate their capped payrolls 
among the highest contributing players on their teams 
based on the equity principle of distributive justice, 
knowing that inequitable distributions can lead to 
feelings of injustice and dissatisfaction among players 
and eventually negatively affect overall team 
performance. For example, team owners in NBA tried 
to adopt some exception rules, such as Bird rule, Rose 
rule or Durant rule, to secure higher salary caps for 
highly contributed players, say franchise stars. With 
these exception rules, teams can properly compensate 
their franchise stars as well as additional talents with 
hire salary. Teams that use exemptions wisely can get 
competitive advantage by securing high-profile players 
while keeping existing players from feeling 
distributional injustice. Second, even though high pay 
dispersion may exist among team members, if the 
players can work together to achieve their goals, the 
native effects of the high pay can be attenuated (Christie 
& Barling, 2010). Thus, team owners and managers 
should consider how they prepare and incorporate other 
reward methods, such as signing bonuses, which may 
reduce injustice perceptions of underpaid players and 
eventually enhance team performance.
This study contributed to the literature on pay 
dispersion in sport by investigating the distinctive 
impact of pay dispersion for players with different team 
contributions. However, this study has also limitations, 
which may offer important paths and, thus, advance this 
stream of research. First, this study only focused on 
professional basketball players in North America. The 
results of this study generally support findings from 
other studies on both organizational justice and pay 
dispersion; however, there may be differences between 
various sports and professional leagues because the 
sports and professional leagues have different salary 
structures (or salary range structure) and mechanisms 
for determining individual and team salaries. Indeed, 
Quirk and Port (1997) discussed many economic aspects 
for success in different professional sports, which make 
running professional sports very complicated. 
Therefore, cautions should be required in generalizing 
these findings. Second, the study only included formally 
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advertised annual salaries of the professional basketball 
players, which does not include signing bonuses, 
commercial benefits, personal sponsorship or extra 
incentive pay for individual and team achievements. 
Thus, future research is encouraged to include other 
types of compensation to facilitate a more accurate 
examination. Third, this study only focused on the 
overall trend of pay dispersion and organizational 
performance rather than individual salary levels and 
individual performance. Thus, future research should 
also employ comprehensive information of individual 
salary levels and individual performance to examine the 
impacts of salary difference on individual player’s 
performance as well as team performance. For example, 
a future study should control each player’s skill, talent, 
and ability, which may have fundamental impacts on 
their salaries, via an experimental research design. 
Finally, some players may be motivated by other factors 
(e.g., loyalty to a coach or team, player’s hometown 
team, a high chance of championship etc.) other than 
just monetary compensation in choosing their teams. In 
these cases, salary or financial compensation may not 
be the most important factor when the players choose 
their teams. Therefore, future research could incorporate 
some of non-monetary factors in accurately examining 
the relationships between pay dispersion and team 
performance.
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Footnote
During this period, the Seattle Supersonics and 
Oklahoma City Thunder were treated as one team 
despite the location and name changes. In addition, the 
Charlotte Hornets moved its franchise to New Orleans 
and were renamed the New Orleans Hornets at the end 
of 2001-02 season. A new expansion franchise in 
Charlotte was launched for the 2004-05 season and 
initially named the Charlotte Bobcats. However, after 
the New Orleans Hornets changed their name to the 
New Orleans Pelicans in 2011, the Charlotte Bobcats 
then renamed themselves as the Charlotte Hornets. 
Therefore, the original Charlotte Hornets (1995-96 to 
2001-02) and New Orleans Hornets (2002-03 to 
2012-13) and Pelicans (2013-14 to present) counted as 
one team, and the Charlotte Bobcats (2004-05 to 
2013-14) and the new Charlotte Hornets (2014-15 to 
present) were counted as another team.
